Category: BGP

The BGP Origin Attribute

Kristijan Taskovski asked an interesting question related to my BGP AS-prepending lab:

I’ve never personally done this on the net but….wouldn’t the BGP origin code also work with moving one’s ingress traffic similarly to AS PATH?

TL&DR: Sort of, but not exactly. Also, just because you can climb up ropes using shoelaces instead of jumars doesn’t mean you should.

Let’s deal with the moving traffic bit first.

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The BGP Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED) Saga

Martijn Van Overbeek left this comment on my LinkedIn post announcing the BGP MED lab:

It might be fixed, but I can recall in the past that there was a lot of quirkiness in multi-vendor environments, especially in how different vendors use it and deal with the setting when the attribute does exist or does not have to exist.

TL&DR: He’s right. It has been fixed (mostly), but the nerd knobs never went away.

In case you’re wondering about the root cause, it was the vagueness of RFC 1771. Now for the full story ;)

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BGP Labs: Set BGP Communities on Outgoing Updates

It’s hard to influence the behavior of someone with strong opinions (just ask any parent with a screaming toddler), and trying to persuade an upstream ISP not to send the traffic over a backup link is no exception – sometimes even AS path prepending is not a strong enough argument.

An easy solution to this problem was proposed in 1990s – what if we could attach some extra attributes (called communities just to confuse everyone) to BGP updates and use them to tell adjacent autonomous systems to lower their BGP local preference? You can practice doing that in the Attach BGP Communities to Outgoing BGP Updates lab exercise.

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Why Do We Need BGP Identifiers?

A friend of mine sent me an interesting question along these lines:

We all know that in OSPF, the router ID is any 32-bit number, not necessarily an IP address of an interface. The only requirement is that it must be unique throughout the OSPF domain. However, I’ve always wondered what the role of BGP router ID is. RFC 4271 says it should be set to an IP address assigned to that BGP speaker, but where do we use it?

Also, he observed somewhat confusing behavior in the wild:

Take two routers and configure the same BGP identifier on both. Cisco IOS will not establish a session, while IOS XR and Junos will.

I decided to take the challenge and dug deep into the bowels of RFC 4271 and RFC 6286. Here’s what I brought back from that rabbit hole:

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Video: Outages Caused by Bugs in BGP Implementations

The previous BGP-related videos described how fat fingers and malicious actors cause Internet outages.

Today, we’ll focus on the impact of bugs in BGP implementations, from malformed AS paths to mishandled transitive attributes. The examples in the video are a few years old, but you can see similar things in the wild in 2023.

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Open BGP Daemons: There's So Many of Them

A while ago, the Networking Notes blog published a link to my “Will Network Devices Reject BGP Sessions from Unknown Sources?” blog post with a hint: use Shodan to find how many BGP routers accept a TCP session from anyone on the Internet.

The results are appalling: you can open a TCP session on port 179 with over 3 million IP addresses.

A report on Shodan opening TCP session to port 179

A report on Shodan opening TCP session to port 179

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Rapid Progress in BGP Route Origin Validation

In 2022, I was invited to speak about Internet routing security at the DEEP conference in Zadar, Croatia. One of the main messages of the presentation was how slow the progress had been even though we had had all the tools available for at least a decade (RFC 7454 was finally published in 2015, and we started writing it in early 2012).

At about that same time, a small group of network operators started cooperating on improving the security and resilience of global routing, eventually resulting in the MANRS initiative – a great place to get an overview of how many Internet Service Providers care about adopting Internet routing security mechanisms.

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Video: Hacking BGP for Fun and Profit

At least some people learn from others’ mistakes: using the concepts proven by some well-publicized BGP leaks, malicious actors quickly figured out how to hijack BGP prefixes for fun and profit.

Fortunately, those shenanigans wouldn’t spread as far today as they did in the past – according to RoVista, most of the largest networks block the prefixes Route Origin Validation (ROV) marks as invalid.

Notes:

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