After I've published a post on how you can use the new router-traffic keyword to minimize the Internet-facing access list you use with CBAC, Euphrates Greene pointed out to me that this feature does not work for client DHCP traffic (if the router is acting as a DHCP client, for example, when connected to a MAN Ethernet environment).

Once you start thinking about what's really going on, it all becomes obvious: as the router has no IP address when it sends the DHCP request, and it sends the DHCP request to a broadcast address (as it doesn't know the IP address of the upstream DHCP server), there is no session that could be entered into the CBAC session table. So you still have to allow all DHCP traffic to your router with an access-list similar to this one:

ip access-list extended Internet
 permit udp any eq bootps any eq bootpc
 deny ip any any

Note: Replace the highlighted any keyword with the actual DHCP server's IP adress if you have it available and you want to have an even more secure IP access-list.

If you have an existing BOOTP environment (for example, a set of old Unix workstations and X-terminals) and want to deploy DHCP on the same LAN segment, you could run into interesting compatibility issues, as the DHCP servers by default responds to BOOTP requests.

However, IOS has an interesting feature when you use a router as a DHCP server: you can tell it to ignore the BOOTP requests with the ip dhcp bootp ignore global configuration command (introduced in 12.2T and 12.3). Even more, the router can respond to DHCP requests and forward BOOTP requests to a non-local BOOTP server configured with the ip helper-address interface configuration command.

In response to the post detailing router response to port scans, one of my readers asked an interesting question:

“I was wondering if there was a way to prevent the router from sending those TCP RST packets administratively prohibited ICMP messages back to scanners for TCP and UDP respectively. I basically want my router to drop all packets period without replying back in any way, shape, form, or fashion.”

Here's how you do it:

For whatever reason, a lot of people have the impression that the wildcard bits in the OSPF network statement have to be the inverse of the interface subnet mask. For example, if you have configured ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.240 on an interface, they would enter network 192.168.1.2 0.0.0.15 in the OSPF configuration (and use one network statement per interface).

In reality, the network statements work like simple IP access-list: whenever an interface IP address matches the network statement, the interface is put into the selected area. The Cisco IOS CLI got better over the years: the network statements are automatically sorted from most-specific to least-specific and (like with the access lists) the first match stops the search.

In my previous post, I've described how you can get a very clean configuration with no holes in your Internet-facing access-list if you have IOS release that supports inspection of router-generated traffic. As it turns out, my solution was not complete - you could not ping from the router. On top of inspecting UDP and TCP traffic (as is usually done), you also have to inspect ICMP traffic that the router uses for pings.

Furthermore, if you use any protocols that have separate control and data sessions (for example, FTP, H.323 or SIP), you have to list them before tcp or udp keywords, otherwise their control streams will not be inspected and there will be no provision for data sessions.

ip inspect name Internet ftp
ip inspect name Internet h.323 router-traffic
ip inspect name Internet sip router-traffic
ip inspect name Internet tcp router-traffic
ip inspect name Internet udp router-traffic
ip inspect name Internet icmp router-traffic
!
interface FastEthernet0/0
 ip access-group Internet in
 ip inspect Internet out
!
ip access-list extended Internet
 deny ip any any

If you want to build a truly redundant LAN infrastructure, you should also have redundant DHCP servers. If you decide to do the DHCP address allocation locally (on the router), you should take care that the two routers acting as DHCP servers don't assign overlapping addresses.

If the address space assigned to a LAN is at least twice as large as the number of LAN-attached devices, you can use the ip dhcp excluded-addresses command to exclude half of the address pool on each router, for example:

ip dhcp pool LAN
 network 192.168.1.0 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0
!
! Exclude router addresses
ip dhcp excluded-addresses 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.10
!
! Exclude half of the pool
ip dhcp excluded-addresses 192.168.0.128 192.168.0.255

Alternatively, you can rely on the ip dhcp ping packets command; the router will ping an IP address to check whether it's live before assigning it (by default, the router sends two pings with 500 millisecond timeout).

Note: You can also inspect the conflicting IP addresses the router found with the show ip dhcp conflict command.

If you’ve ever had to configure OSPF on a Cisco router, you’re well familiar with the venerable network statement, which effectively assigns interfaces into OSPF areas based on their IP addresses. Although our life became simpler when the network statements stopped being order-dependent (the order dependency allowed for a few nasty surprises in the troubleshooting part of the CCIE lab when the CCIE title still implied you had to be able to fix other people’s mistakes :), it was still an awkward way of configuring what belongs where.

Every now and then I'm getting questions from my readers regarding the suitability of my MPLS books for the CCIP exam, for example:

I'm pursuing my CCIP and have a hard time finding the right MPLS study guide. I know you have the CCIP edition that was written in 2002, but I think the exam topics have changed. Can you recommend what book or books are best for the CCIP MPLS exam?

Are MPLS VPN Architectures Volume 1 & 2 two completely separate books or is Volume 2 a newer release. I was thinking of going for the CCIP and wanted to know if I should get both books or just the more recent one.

Here’s an interesting OSPF-related question I got::

“Which one is better: default-information originate or default-information originate always?”

As always, the answer is it depends. If your OSPF edge routers have external default routes (for example, static default routes toward the Internet, see the next diagram), you'd want them to announce the default route only when they have a default themselves (otherwise, they would attract the traffic and then blackhole it). In this case, you’d use default-information originate.

Another Cisco IOS OSPF implementation trivia: if you’re redistributing a default route into OSPF (for example, you have a static default route configured with ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 … and you use redistribute static subnets within the OSPF process), the default route will not be entered into the OSPF database unless you configure default-information originate within the router ospf configuration.

Similarly, if you configure default-information originate always, the router will inject the type 5 LSA for the default route into the OSPF topology database even if the router itself does not have a default route (or gateway of last resort).

Recently I was investigating MTU-related problems and got mightily upset when I had to search for the interface IP MTU size in the long printout produced by the show ip interface command. Obviously I could display the IP MTU size of a single interface with the show ip interface name | include MTU filter, but I wanted to have a nice tabular printout. Obviously it was time for another Tcl script.

To use it, download it and store it into the flash memory of your router. Configure alias exec ipconfig tclsh flash:ipInterfaces.tcl and you can use ipconfig or ipconfig active to display interface IP addresses.

One of the hardest troubleshooting problems within an MPLS VPN network has always been finding a broken LSP. While you could (in theory) use the IP ping or traceroute (assuming all hops support ICMP extensions for MPLS), the results are not always reliable… and interpreting them is not so easy. For example, after I've disabled LDP on an interface with the no mpls ip configuration command, the routers in the LSP path still reported outgoing MPLS labels in ICMP replies for a few seconds (until the LDP holddown timer expired on both ends of the link).

As a side note, would you deduce from the printout that the break in the LSP path happened on the router with the IP address 192.168.201.1?

Due to the way Cisco routers behave when dropping packets with an inbound access list, whenever you use access lists to protect the router from the outside attacks (or port scans), the protected ports (even though they're not active on the router) will appear filtered (some scanners might use the term stealth), which is almost an invitation to a determined hacker.

Sometimes (it depends on the application you're protecting) you can configure application-layer protection in Cisco IOS. For example, you can protect HTTP server with ip http access-class global configuration command or the Telnet server with the access-class in line configuration command (and BGP will not accept incoming TCP SYN packets unless you've configured a BGP neighbor). The access-class configuration causes the incoming request to be rejected within application (in control plane after the TCP stack), resulting in TCP RST packet being sent back. The port scanner thus reports the protected TCP port as closed.

Under some circumstances, you might want to tune the ARP timers on the router (for example, when using ARP as a keepalive mechanism to detect whether the host is up). Unfortunately, although you can set the per-interface arp timeout in seconds, the actual timer resolution is in minutes. For example, if you set the ARP timeout to 10 seconds, the router will age the ARP entries once per minute.