Category: security

Another question I got in my Inbox:

What is your opinion on NAC and 802.1x for wired networks? Is there a better way to solve user access control at layer 2? Or is this a poor man's way to avoid network segmentation and internal network firewalls.

Unless you can trust all users (fat chance) or run a network with no access control (unlikely, unless you’re a coffee shop), you need to authenticate the users anyway.

Security groups (or Endpoint Groups if you’re a Cisco ACI fan) are a nice traffic policy abstraction: instead of dealing with subnets and ACLs, define groups of hosts and the rules of traffic control between them… and let the orchestration system deal with IP addresses and TCP/UDP port numbers.

One of my readers sent me this question:

After reading this blog post and a lot of blog posts about zero trust mode versus security zones, what do you think about replacing L3 Data Center core switches by High Speed Next Generation Firewalls?

Long story short: just because someone writes about an idea doesn’t mean it makes sense. Some things are better left in PowerPoint.

Every now and then someone actually looks at the VXLAN packet format and eventually figures out that VXLAN encapsulation doesn’t provide any intrinsic security.

TL&DR Summary: That’s old news, the sky is not falling, and deploying VXLAN won’t make your network less secure than traditional VLAN- or MPLS-based networks.

The video of my Troopers 15 IPv6 Microsegmentation presentation has been published on YouTube. As with the Automating Network Security video, it’s hard to read the slides; you might want to look at the slide deck on my public content web site.

You’ll find more about this topic, including tested Cisco IOS configurations, in IPv6 Microsegmentation webinar.

The video of my Automating Network Security talk @ Troopers 15 has been published on YouTube. They used fixed camera and the slides are a bit hard to read; you’ll find a better copy of the slide deck on my content web site.

For a bit of fun, turn on closed captions (CC) – public cloud became public lout.

Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) protocol is well hidden deep in the bowels of IPv6 protocol stack and most of us tend to gloss over it when we discuss IPv6 neighbor discovery process… until MLD raises its ugly head to bite an unsuspecting network administrator.

The problems with MLD are not new (and I wrote exhaustively about them a while ago), but it’s always nice to see other people raise awareness of broken IPv6 features like Enno Rey and his security team did during the IPv6 Security Summit (part of Troopers 15 conference).

The fantastic Troopers 15 conference is in full swing… and I’m done with the presentations ;) The last talk I had during the conference focused on automating network security. The slides are already online; I’ll add the link to the recording when they upload the videos.

Christoph Jaggi, the author of Metro Ethernet and Carrier Ethernet Encryption Market Overview published an awesome follow-up document: an evaluation guide that lists most of the gotchas one has to be aware of when considering encryption gear, from deployment scenarios, network overhead and key exchange details to operational considerations. If you have to deal with any aspect of network encryption, this document is a must-read.

One of the interesting challenges in the Software-Defined Data Center world is the integration of network and security services with the compute infrastructure and network virtualization. Palo Alto claims to have tightly integrated their firewalls with VMware NSX and numerous cloud orchestration platforms - it was time to figure out how that’s done, so we decided to go on a field trip into the scary world of security.

Most overlay virtual networking and cloud orchestration products support security groups – more-or-less-statefulish ACLs inserted between VM NIC and virtual switch.

The lure of security groups is obvious: if you’re willing to change your network security paradigm, you can stop thinking in subnets and focus on specifying who can exchange what traffic (usually specified as TCP/UDP port#) with whom.

Every now and then I get an email from a subscriber having video download problems. Most of the time the problem auto-magically disappears (and there’s no indication of packet loss or ridiculous latency in traceroute printout), but a few days ago Henry Moats managed to consistently reproduce the problem and sent me exactly what I needed: a pcap file.

TL&DR summary: you have to know a lot about application-level protocols, application servers and operating systems to troubleshoot networking problems.

During one of my ExpertExpress engagements I got an interesting question: “could we replace a pair of central firewalls with iptables on the Linux server?”

Short answer: Maybe (depending on your security policy), but I’d still love to see some baseline scrubbing before the traffic hits the server – after all, if someone pwns your server, he’ll quickly turn off iptables.

I hope you know TCP provides a reliable stream service not reliable packet delivery, but you might not have realized all the implications – I found an old post by Robert Graham explaining how things really work and how you can use them to bypass quick-and-dirty IDS that rely on signatures instead of doing proper protocol decodes.

Stefan de Kooter (@sdktr) sent me a follow-up question to my Going All Virtual with Virtual WAN Edge Routers blog post:

How would one interface with external Internet in this scenario? I totally get the virtual network assets mantra, but even a virtual BGP router would need to get a physical interconnect one way or another.

As always, there are plenty of solutions depending on your security needs.