I have NEVER found a customer application team that can tell me all the servers they are using, their IP addresses, let alone the ports they use.
His proposed solution: use software like Tetration (or any other flow collecting tool) to figure out what’s really going on:
Perhaps a paradigm shift is due for firewalls in general? I’m thinking quickly here but wondering if we perhaps just had a protocol by which a host could request upstream firewall(s) to open access inbound on their behalf dynamically, the hosts themselves would then automatically inform the security device what ports they need/want opened upstream.
Having spent my career in various roles in IT security, Ivan and I always bounced thoughts on the overlap between networking and security (and, more recently, Cloud/Container) around. One of the hot challenges on that boundary that regularly comes up in network/security discussions is the topic of this blog post: microsegmentation and host-based firewalls (HBFs).
Robert Graham wrote a great article explaining why CEOs don’t care much about cybersecurity or any other non-core infrastructure (including networking, unless you happen to be working for a service provider). It’s a must-read if you want to understand the **** you have to deal with in enterprise environments.
Every now and then a security researcher “discovers” a tunneling protocol designed to be used over a protected transport core and “declares it vulnerable” assuming the attacker can connect to that transport network… even though the protocol was purposefully designed that way, and everyone with a bit of clue knew the whole story years ago (and/or it’s even documented in the RFC).
It was MPLS decades ago, then VXLAN a few years ago, and now someone “found” a “high-impact vulnerability” in GPRS Tunnel Protocol. Recommended countermeasures: whitelist-based IP filtering. Yeah, it’s amazing what a wonderful new tool they found.
Unfortunately (for the rest of us), common sense never generated headlines on Hacker News (or anywhere else).
Brian Krebs wrote an interesting analysis of CIA’s Wikileaks report. In a nutshell, they were a victim of “move fast to get the mission done” shadow IT.
It could have been worse. Someone with a credit card could have started deploying stuff in AWS ;))
Not that anyone would learn anything from the PR nightmare that followed.
On May 14th 2020, Marcel Gamma, tech industry journalist, and editor-in-chief at inside-it.ch and inside-channels.ch, published an article discussing several glaring security vulnerabilities in Silver Peak’s SD-WAN products on inside-it.ch. The original article was written in German; Marcel was kind enough to translate it into English and get permission from his publisher to have the English version published on ipSpace.net.
Security researchers make serious accusations against SD-Wan manufacturer Silver Peak. The latter disagrees. Swiss experts are analyzing the case.
By Marcel Gamma,
Silver Peak is accused of laxity in dealing with security issues and in dealing with security researchers who act within the framework of Responsible Disclosure.
It’s amazing how many people still believe in Security Fairy (the mythical entity that makes your application magically secure), fueling the whole industry of security researchers who happily create excruciatingly detailed talks of how you can use whatever security oversight to wreak havoc (even when the limitations of a technology are clearly spelled out in an RFC).
In the Networks Are Not Secure (part of How Networks Really Work webinar) I described why we should never rely on network infrastructure to provide security, but have to implement it higher up in the application stack.
As I explained in How Networks Really Work and Upcoming Internet Challenges webinars, routing security, and BGP security in particular remain one of the unsolved challenges we’ve been facing for decades (see also: what makes BGP a hot mess).
Fortunately, due to enormous efforts of a few persistent individuals BGP RPKI is getting traction (NTT just went all-in), and Flavio Luciani and Tiziano Tofoni decided to do their part creating an excellent in-depth document describing BGP RPKI theory and configuration on Cisco- and Juniper routers.
There are only two things you have to do:
- Read the document;
- Implement RPKI in your network.
Thank you, the Internet will be grateful.
When I’ve seen my good friends Christopher Werny and Enno Rey talk about IPv6 security at RIPE78 meeting, another bit of one of my puzzles fell in place. I was planning to do an update of the IPv6 security webinar I’d done with Eric Vyncke, and always wanted to get it done by a security practitioner focused on enterprise networks, making Christopher a perfect fit.
As it was almost a decade since we did the original webinar, Christopher started with an overview of IPv6 security challenges (TL&DR: not much has changed).
If you’re running a typical (somewhat outdated) enterprise data center, you’re using tons of VLANs and firewalls, use VLANs as security zones, and push inter-VLAN traffic through firewalls for inspection. Security vendors love that approach - when inspecting traffic they can add no value to (like database- or backup sessions), the firewalls quickly become choke points that have to be upgraded.
Is your argument that the technology works as designed and any issues with it are a people problem?
A polite question like that deserves more than 280-character reply, but I tried to do my best:
BGP definitely works even better than designed. Is that good enough? Probably, and we could politely argue about that… but the root cause of most of the problems we see today (and people love to yammer about) is not the protocol or how it was designed but how sloppily it’s used.
Laura somewhat disagreed with my way of handling the issue:
Every now and then a smart person decides to walk away from their competence zone, and start spreading pointless clickbait opinions like BGP is a hot mess.
Like any other technology, BGP is just a tool with its advantages and limitations. And like any other tool, BGP can be used sloppily… and that’s what’s causing the various problems and shenanigans everyone is talking about.
Just in case you might be interested in facts instead of easy-to-digest fiction:
I was listening to a nice podcast with Nick Buraglio discussing the recent BGP hijack SNAFU impacting Cloudflare (and their reaction) and while I usually totally agree with Nick, I think that he tried to be way too nice when saying (paraphrasing) “I think Cloudflare was a bit harsh - I would prefer a more community-oriented approach along the lines of how could we help you do your job better”
This is a guest blog post by Andrea Dainese, senior network and security architect, and author of UNetLab (now EVE-NG) and Route Reflector Labs. These days you’ll find him busy automating Cisco ACI deployments.
Following the Ivan’s post about Firewall Ruleset Automation, I decided to take a step forward: can we always have up-to-date and clean firewall policies without stale rules?
We usually configure and manage firewalls using a process like this: