Building network automation solutions

9 module online course

Start now!

Category: security

Building Secure Layer-2 Data Center Fabric with Cisco Nexus Switches

One of my readers is designing a layer-2-only data center fabric (no SVI interfaces on switches) with stringent security requirements using Cisco Nexus switches, and he wondered whether a host connected to such a fabric could attack a switch, and whether it would be possible to reach the management network in that way.

Do you think it’s possible to reach the MANAGEMENT PLANE from the DATA PLANE? Is it valid to think that there is a potential attack vector that someone can compromise to source traffic from the front of the device (ASIC) through the PCI bus across the CPU to the across the PCI bus to the Platform Controller Hub through the I/O card to spew out the Management Port onto that out-of-band network?

My initial answer was “of course there’s always a conduit from the switching ASIC to the CPU, how would you handle STP/CDP/LLDP otherwise”. I also asked Lukas Krattiger for more details; here’s what he sent me:

read more add comment

Post-Quantum Cryptography: Hype and Reality

Post-quantum cryptography (algorithms resistant to quantum computer attacks) is quickly turning into another steaming pile of hype vigorously explored by various security vendors.

Christoph Jaggi made it his task to debunk at least some of the worst hype, collected information from people implementing real-life solutions in this domain, and wrote an excellent overview article explaining the potential threats, solutions, and current state-of-the art.

You (RFC 6919) OUGHT TO read his article before facing the first vendor presentation on the topic.

add comment

Using Flow Tracking to Build Firewall Rulesets... and Halting Problem

Peter Welcher identified the biggest network security hurdle faced by most enterprise IT environments in his comment to Considerations for Host-based Firewalls (Part 1) blog post:

I have NEVER found a customer application team that can tell me all the servers they are using, their IP addresses, let alone the ports they use.

His proposed solution: use software like Tetration (or any other flow collecting tool) to figure out what’s really going on:

read more see 1 comments

Why Don't We Have Dynamic Firewall Policies

One of the readers of the Considerations for Host-Based Firewalls blog post wrote this interesting comment:

Perhaps a paradigm shift is due for firewalls in general? I’m thinking quickly here but wondering if we perhaps just had a protocol by which a host could request upstream firewall(s) to open access inbound on their behalf dynamically, the hosts themselves would then automatically inform the security device what ports they need/want opened upstream.

Well, we have at least two protocols that could fit the bill: Universal Plug and Play and Port Control Protocol (RFC 6887).

read more see 4 comments

Considerations for Host-based Firewalls (Part 1)

This is a guest blog post by Matthias Luft, Principal Platform Security Engineer @ Salesforce, and a regular ipSpace.net guest speaker.

Having spent my career in various roles in IT security, Ivan and I always bounced thoughts on the overlap between networking and security (and, more recently, Cloud/Container) around. One of the hot challenges on that boundary that regularly comes up in network/security discussions is the topic of this blog post: microsegmentation and host-based firewalls (HBFs).

read more see 8 comments

OMG, Not Again: New Mobile Internet Protocol Vulnerabilities

Every now and then a security researcher “discovers” a tunneling protocol designed to be used over a protected transport core and “declares it vulnerable” assuming the attacker can connect to that transport network… even though the protocol was purposefully designed that way, and everyone with a bit of clue knew the whole story years ago (and/or it’s even documented in the RFC).

It was MPLS decades ago, then VXLAN a few years ago, and now someone “found” a “high-impact vulnerability” in GPRS Tunnel Protocol. Recommended countermeasures: whitelist-based IP filtering. Yeah, it’s amazing what a wonderful new tool they found.

Unfortunately (for the rest of us), common sense never generated headlines on Hacker News (or anywhere else).

add comment

SD-WAN Security: A Product Liability Insurance Law Would Certainly Help

On May 14th 2020, Marcel Gamma, tech industry journalist, and editor-in-chief at inside-it.ch and inside-channels.ch, published an article discussing several glaring security vulnerabilities in Silver Peak’s SD-WAN products on inside-it.ch. The original article was written in German; Marcel was kind enough to translate it into English and get permission from his publisher to have the English version published on ipSpace.net.


Security researchers make serious accusations against SD-Wan manufacturer Silver Peak. The latter disagrees. Swiss experts are analyzing the case.

By Marcel Gamma,

Silver Peak is accused of laxity in dealing with security issues and in dealing with security researchers who act within the framework of Responsible Disclosure.

read more see 3 comments

Video: Networks Are (Not) Secure

It’s amazing how many people still believe in Security Fairy (the mythical entity that makes your application magically secure), fueling the whole industry of security researchers who happily create excruciatingly detailed talks of how you can use whatever security oversight to wreak havoc (even when the limitations of a technology are clearly spelled out in an RFC).

In the Networks Are Not Secure (part of How Networks Really Work webinar) I described why we should never rely on network infrastructure to provide security, but have to implement it higher up in the application stack.

You need Free ipSpace.net Subscription to watch the video, and the Standard ipSpace.net Subscription to register for upcoming live sessions.
add comment

MUST READ: Using BGP RPKI for a Safer Internet

As I explained in How Networks Really Work and Upcoming Internet Challenges webinars, routing security, and BGP security in particular remain one of the unsolved challenges we’ve been facing for decades (see also: what makes BGP a hot mess).

Fortunately, due to enormous efforts of a few persistent individuals BGP RPKI is getting traction (NTT just went all-in), and Flavio Luciani and Tiziano Tofoni decided to do their part creating an excellent in-depth document describing BGP RPKI theory and configuration on Cisco- and Juniper routers.

There are only two things you have to do:

Thank you, the Internet will be grateful.

2020-04-02 16:00 UTC - Two interesting events happened on April 1st. This is why we badly need RPKI and this is why we might need another document describing “how to back up ROAs and have a recovery procedure that takes less than 20 hours
add comment

Video: IPv6 Security Overview

When I’ve seen my good friends Christopher Werny and Enno Rey talk about IPv6 security at RIPE78 meeting, another bit of one of my puzzles fell in place. I was planning to do an update of the IPv6 security webinar I’d done with Eric Vyncke, and always wanted to get it done by a security practitioner focused on enterprise networks, making Christopher a perfect fit.

As it was almost a decade since we did the original webinar, Christopher started with an overview of IPv6 security challenges (TL&DR: not much has changed).

You need Free ipSpace.net Subscription to watch the video.
add comment

Public Cloud Networking Security is Different

If you’re running a typical (somewhat outdated) enterprise data center, you’re using tons of VLANs and firewalls, use VLANs as security zones, and push inter-VLAN traffic through firewalls for inspection. Security vendors love that approach - when inspecting traffic they can add no value to (like database- or backup sessions), the firewalls quickly become choke points that have to be upgraded.

read more see 4 comments

BGP- and Car Safety

The Facts and Fiction: BGP Is a Hot Mess blog post generated tons of responses, including a thoughtful tweet from Laura Alonso:

Is your argument that the technology works as designed and any issues with it are a people problem?

A polite question like that deserves more than 280-character reply, but I tried to do my best:

BGP definitely works even better than designed. Is that good enough? Probably, and we could politely argue about that… but the root cause of most of the problems we see today (and people love to yammer about) is not the protocol or how it was designed but how sloppily it’s used.

Laura somewhat disagreed with my way of handling the issue:

read more see 2 comments

Facts and Fiction: BGP Is a Hot Mess

Every now and then a smart person decides to walk away from their competence zone, and start spreading pointless clickbait opinions like BGP is a hot mess.

Like any other technology, BGP is just a tool with its advantages and limitations. And like any other tool, BGP can be used sloppily… and that’s what’s causing the various problems and shenanigans everyone is talking about.

Just in case you might be interested in facts instead of easy-to-digest fiction:

read more see 5 comments
Sidebar