When I’ve been describing the limitations of kron, someone quickly asked an interesting question:

As I cannot insert extra input keystrokes with EEM applet, can I run a Tcl script from it with the action sequence cli command “tclsh script” command and use the typeahead function call to get around the limitation?”

The only answer I could give at that time was “maybe” … and obviously it was time for a more thorough test. The short result is: YES, you can do it (at least in IOS release 12.4(15)T1).

When two groups within Cisco needed time-based command execution in Cisco IOS, they (in a typical big-corporation fashion) decided to implement the same wheel from two different sets of spokes and rims. One group built the Embedded Event Manager with its event timer cron command (introduced in 12.2(25)S and 12.3(14)T), the other group created the more limited kron command set (introduced in 12.3(1)).

In my home office, I'm using DSL access to the Internet with ISDN backup to another ISP, as shown on the next figure:

Obviously, I would like the ISDN backup to kick in whenever the primary connection goes down; two static default routes and reliable static routing on the primary default seem like a perfect solution.

I've stumbled across a blog post that indicates there's still confusion on some fundamental configuration issues. I will not even try to guess whether there is a wide consensus on how to configure a router, but these are the facts (and here is a ten year old position from Cisco):

• Type-7 encryption used in enable password has been broken. Source code for the decrypt program and cracker programs are available online, or you could use a router to do it for you.
• The type-7 encryption is reversible (and easily breakable due to a weak algorithm), whereas type-5 encryption is a one-way encryption that probably requires a dictionary attack to break.
• Based on the previous two facts, you should never use enable password. Use enable secret.
• The service password-encryption encodes passwords attached to local usernames with type-7 encryption. The usage of type-7 encryption is necessary as you might need the cleartext passwords in some authentication mechanisms (for example, CHAP). However, it's still better to have scrambled passwords than cleartext ones; at least a casual observer will not be able to read them. Conclusion: use service password-encryption.
• If your authentication methods don't need cleartext passwords (examples: local username/password authentication, local AAA authentication or PAP authentication), use username secret configuration command (available from IOS releases 12.2T, 12.3 and 12.0S).

I had to figure out various PPP parameters (and associated Cisco IOS behavior) and didn't have real dial-up equipment in my lab setup. I could have gone with PPPoE, but it turned out it's way simpler to emulate dialup connections (at least the PPP negotiations work as expected) on fixed serial lines. This is the minimum setup you need on the “caller” side …

interface Serial1/0
 ip address negotiated
 encapsulation ppp
 ppp authentication pap optional
 ppp pap sent-username client password 0 client

… and this is the “server”-side configuration:

interface Serial1/0
 ip address 10.0.0.33 255.255.255.252
 encapsulation ppp
 peer default ip address 10.0.0.34
 ppp authentication pap callin
!
username client password client

To trigger PPP negotiations, shut down and re-enable the serial interface on either side.

Note: As I'm using PAP authentication, I could use the more secure username secret configuration command, which would not work with CHAP.

A while ago I was asked to write an article about IPv6 training. I could just cover the training aspect, like what’s offered (answer: not much) and whether someone can train the whole operations team like you could in the IPv4 or MPLS/VPN world (answer: no), but I wanted to understand whether anyone is really using IPv6 in a production network.

I found a few academic networks (after all, there are about 2000 IPv6 prefixes assigned and someone should be doing something with them), but not much of what I would call a real production environment, which is a bad thing, as it looks like the IPv4 address space will get saturated in a few years.

Martin Kluge sent me an interesting BGP question: he has two upstream links and runs BGP on both. Since his router is low on RAM, he cannot accept full routing, so he’s just announcing his IP prefix and using static default routing toward upstream ISPs.

Tim Riegert sent me an interesting hint: you don't need password crackers to decode type-7 passwords, you just need access to a router. Here's how you do it:

You can use the show process cpu sorted command in combination with an output filter to display only those IOS processes that consumed noticeable amount of CPU time in the last five minutes, last minute or last five seconds. Use the following patterns to construct your regular expression:

• The [0-9.]+% pattern will match any non-zero percentage;
• The 0.00% pattern will obviously match the zero-percentage display;
• As the percentage figures are separated by various amounts of whitespace characters, we have to use the ' +' pattern to match those;

The show filter should exclude the processes that have the zero percentage in the desired column and any percentage in the other two columns (any other filter would show too many or too few processes). To display processes active in the last minute, use the show process cpu sorted 1min | exclude [0-9.]+% +0.00% +[0-9.]+% command (and define an alias to make it easier to use).

Someone has asked me a while ago whether it's possible to retain variable values between invocations of an EEM policy. Since a new copy of Tcl interpreter is started for each event, global variables obviously won't work; they are lost as soon as the Tcl policy is finished. A potential solution is to modify the router's configuration and save the values you wish to preserve in event manager environment, but that's a time-consuming process that interferes with whatever router configuration management process you have.

The real solution is based on the appl_setinfo and appl_reqinfo calls. They work, but like many other Tcl-related IOS features they are … well … weird.

Thinking about the implications of bit stuffing I wrote about in the SDLC post, I realized that long sequences of ones would be transmitted slower than long sequences of zeroes due to an extra bit being inserted after every fifth consecutive one. The theory would predict a 20% decrease in transmission speed.

Of course I wanted to test this phenomenon immediately. I connected two routers with a low-speed (64 kbps) link, and started a series of pings. Not surprisingly, the results confirmed the theory:

A few days ago I was describing the impact of CEF accounting on a router (based on its architecture). The picture is clearer with Netflow: Cisco has published a white paper detailing the impact of various types of Netflow accounting on a large variety of platforms, from an 1800 ISR to the GSR (12000).

The link to this white paper has been published in Joe Harris' blog.

Speaking of Joe Harris … he just wrote a great post about the IP routing table profiling available in Cisco IOS and the ways it can be used to monitor the stability of your network.

Joe Harris published an excellent post detailing how you can use Flexible Packet Matching to recognize (and potentially block) Skype traffic. The solution depends on recognizing the first four bytes sent by the Skype application in a TCP session. While this is a great idea, you have to be aware that there's always a non-zero chance of false positives, more so as the described filter is testing the beginning of the payload in every TCP packet (not just the first data packet in the session).

My recent post about problems with old modems has generated a lot of comments with some very useful ideas, but nobody addressed the question “why was a long string of ones not a problem?”, so let's start there. Almost all WAN synchronous protocols in use today are descendants of venerable SDLC invented by IBM more than 30 years ago. SDLC was later extended to support connectionless and balanced modes, resulting in HDLC. PPP is just an extension of HDLC, adding support for negotiations and standard layer-3 protocol demultiplexing. In SDLC, IBM also solved the frame delimiting and associated escape character problem inherent in previous protocols like BSC (DLE was used in BSC) by introducing bit stuffing: a zero would be inserted after five consecutive ones (and silently removed by the receiver) to differentiate the regular data stream from framing (six consecutive ones) and abort (more than six consecutive ones) sequences. Thus, the HDLC (or PPP) data stream can never contain more than six consecutive ones and the long sequences of ones never cause synchronization loss.

IBM obviously also had problems with bad modems and solved it with the NRZI encoding that was part of SDLC standard (and a major pain in the good old days when the appliques on the old Cisco routers did not support it and we've been trying hard to penetrate IBM accounts). You can still configure NRZI encoding on most routers' serial links (it might depend on the actual hardware platform) with the nrzi-encoding interface configuration command (you had to do it with jumpers in the AGS+). Incidentally, changing interface encoding to NRZI was really helpful when you had to break things in the preparation for the troubleshooting part of the original CCIE lab).

Enough theory, let's summarize the proposed solutions:

• The nrzi-encoding (if available) is the best one, as it reliably solves the problem, is transparent and does not incur additional overhead.
• Compression or encryption are OK, but they result in significant CPU overhead (unless you have hardware encryption/compression modules) and might (at least in theory) still produce a long sequence of zeroes, although with a very low probability. IPSec also introduces overhead due to additional IPSec headers.
• LFI (effectively multilink PPP over a single link) is also a good solution, as the PPP framing and MLPPP headers break the long sequences of zeroes (you might have to fine-tune the fragment size with ppp multilink fragment size configuration command), but it introduces overhead on the WAN link.
• IP fragmentation would work, but would be quite bandwidth-consuming. If the fragmentation would be performed by the router, the overhead would be 20 bytes per fragment (IP header), if the sending host performs the fragmentation, the overhead is 40 bytes per fragment for TCP sessions. For example, if we reduce the IP MTU size to 256 bytes, the TCP session overhead is over 18% (and we were scoffing at the ATM designers that made us live with 10% overhead).

There were also a few suggestions that would not work very well:

• The invert data command would only help if the modem has problems with long strings of zeroes, not with long strings of the same value.
• The tunnel key command just sets a 4-byte field in the GRE header but does not affect the encapsulated data at all.