Protecting the primary DNS server on your router
In a comment to my post describing how to make a router into a primary DNS server, one of the readers noted that you could easily overload a router doing that ... and he's obviously right.
Apart from having too many valid DNS requests for the zone the router is responsible for, the observed behavior could be spam-related. Just a few days ago when I've discussed the router-based DNS server with my security engineers, they've pointed out that a lot of spammers perform regular DNS attacks trying to poison the DNS cache of unpatched open caching DNS servers.
Obviously, a router is no match in raw CPU power to a high-end server, so even when running the authoritative server on the router, it might not be a bad idea to use a DNS server of your ISP as the secondary DNS and list only the ISP's DNS server in the NS records for your zone. This would deflect most of the traffic (as nobody would know your router is acting as a DNS server), but I would still apply an inbound access-list allowing only DNS queries from the secondary name server on the Internet-facing interface.
Alternatively, you could protect the router with Control Plane Policing and drop excessive DNS request packets, but that would affect the queries you should respond to as well.
Apart from having too many valid DNS requests for the zone the router is responsible for, the observed behavior could be spam-related. Just a few days ago when I've discussed the router-based DNS server with my security engineers, they've pointed out that a lot of spammers perform regular DNS attacks trying to poison the DNS cache of unpatched open caching DNS servers.
Obviously, a router is no match in raw CPU power to a high-end server, so even when running the authoritative server on the router, it might not be a bad idea to use a DNS server of your ISP as the secondary DNS and list only the ISP's DNS server in the NS records for your zone. This would deflect most of the traffic (as nobody would know your router is acting as a DNS server), but I would still apply an inbound access-list allowing only DNS queries from the secondary name server on the Internet-facing interface.
Alternatively, you could protect the router with Control Plane Policing and drop excessive DNS request packets, but that would affect the queries you should respond to as well.
I've also seen people who use pretty powerful boxes (7200-series or 7300-series routers) to provide solely the BGP route reflection service, as well as ingenious networking engineers who deployed boxes phased out of production network to serve as various servers (for example, NTP server).
I have an IPSec VPN between 2 sites.
Do you have any idea whether it's possible to route email for 1 particular domain (@company.com) over the VPN?
If you configure the destination mail server for company.com to be an address reachable over the IPSec VPN (the mail server on the other site), the mail for that domain will be delivered over the VPN.
no ip name-server 10.1.1.1
, where 10.1.1.1 is the routers own f0/0 interface, the issues went away.
I'm just learning so I have no idea what I'm doing most of the time. I just try things and see what happens but I was wondering if this could be the cause of high utilization others are seeing.